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Abstract
If ﬁrm pricing is state, rather than time-dependent, ﬁrms are more likely to change prices whenever aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks reinforce each other and trigger desired price changes in the same direction. The distribution
of idiosyncratic shocks across adjusting ﬁrms therefore varies over time in response to economy-wide disturbances: in
times of, say, monetary expansions, the fraction of adjusting ﬁrms that have negative idiosyncratic technology shocks
should increase. Using measures of technology shocks derived from production function estimates for four-digit US
manufacturing industries, we ﬁnd that sectoral inﬂation rates are more responsive to negative, as opposed to positive
technology disturbances in periods of higher economy-wide inﬂation, commodity price increases and expansionary
monetary policy shocks. We argue, using a quantitative state-dependent sticky price model calibrated to match key
features of the US micro-price data, that these results suggest that pricing is state-dependent in US manufacturing.
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Money and real activity are strongly correlated at business cycle frequencies. The strength of this
correlation has led the profession to a widespread use of models employing nominal rigidities in an attempt to
explain salient macroeconomic phenomena. Two distinct approaches to modeling nominal rigidities have been
used in earlier work. The ﬁrst approach, exempliﬁed by the work of Fisher (1977) and Taylor (1980), assumes
that the timing of price changes is independent of shocks aﬀecting the ﬁrm in each period. Institutional
restrictions or information-gathering costs prevent ﬁrms from meeting too often and instead, ﬁrms have
predetermined schedules of price adjustment. These are the so-called time-dependent models, which, because
of their computational tractability, have received most of the profession’s attention in the last two decades.
The second tradition, dating back to Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), assumes that observing the state of the
world is inexpensive, but that ﬁrms incur ﬁxed physical costs of price adjustment every time they undergo a
new price change. This second generation of models, the so-called state-dependent models, are grounded in
solid micro-foundations as they explicitly model the source of nominal rigidities, but have been, with a few
notable exceptions, neglected by the profession because of their computational complexity.
Despite the fact that most policy-oriented macroeconomic models use the time-dependent assumption
of an exogenous timing of price changes, the distinction between state and time-dependent sticky price models
is not innocuous. Caplin and Spulber (1987) show that under special assumptions about the distribution of
ﬁrm prices and the stochastic process of the money supply, a monetary expansion has no eﬀect on output:
although few ﬁrms adjust in response to the shock, the ﬁrms that do adjust are those that need the largest
changes in their nominal prices and the aggregate price level in their economy grows at the same rate as
the money supply. Recent research, grounded in explicit household and ﬁrm maximization, and using more
realistic stochastic forcing processes calibrated from the US data, has overturned this neutrality result, but
nevertheless reaches the conclusion that state-dependent pricing models generate smaller real eﬀects from
monetary shocks. In Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), ﬁrms synchronize prices in response to aggregate
disturbances, and increase price in tandem in response to large aggregate disturbances. Golosov and Lucas
(2004) solve a state-dependent pricing model in which ﬁrms are subject to marginal cost shocks and ﬁnd that
the model, calibrated to match microeconomic data on the size and frequency of price changes, generates
1very little output volatility.
Given that time and state-dependent sticky price models produce diﬀerent implications regarding the
ability of nominal disturbances to explain business cycle ﬂuctuations, an important question that, with a
few exceptions, has received little attention is: is ﬁrm pricing state or time-dependent? Time-dependent
rules are optimal if ﬁrms incur information-gathering costs that prevent them from observing the state of
the world each period1. On the other hand, ﬁrms follow state-dependent rules if ﬁxed physical costs of price
changes are mainly responsible for nominal rigidities. Recent evidence suggests that time-dependent rules
are the rule, rather than exception. Zbaracki et. al. (2004) study the price adjustment practices of a large
US manufacturing ﬁrm. The ﬁrm under consideration revises prices infrequently, once every year, during a
“pricing season”, which generally occurs at the same time during the year, from August to November. Blinder
et. al. (1998) use survey evidence collected from a national, multi-industry sample of 200 CEOs and ﬁnd
that time-dependent rules of price adjustment are twice as common as state-dependent rules. Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2004) draw a similar conclusion by calibrating a state-dependent model to match the fact that
ﬁrms do not synchronize their price changes in response to aggregate shocks in the US economy. They ﬁnd
that a state-dependent model can be made consistent with this ﬁnding if the distribution of menu costs a ﬁrm
faces each period is (close to) degenerate at two mass points and ﬁrms face either zero or very large menu
costs, which leads them to behave similarly to ﬁrms in a Calvo-type environment in which the timing of price
adjustment is exogenous2.Aﬁnal piece of evidence is the work of Cecchetti (1986) and Kashyap (1995) who
study newspaper and catalogue prices, respectively, and ﬁnd that the frequency of price changes increases
during periods of higher overall inﬂation. This evidence alone cannot however distinguish between time
and state-dependent pricing models. Although simple time-dependent models indeed postulate an exogenous
frequency of price changes, ﬁrms that face information-gathering costs and behave in a time-dependent fashion
would choose to increase the frequency of price changes in environments of higher inﬂation if the source of
nominal rigidities were explicitly modeled.
In this paper we use indirect evidence based on sectoral inﬂation rates in 450 SIC four-digit manufac-
1See for example Bonomo and Cavalho (2004).
2Although, as Golosov and Lucas (2004) show, a state-dependent model in which ﬁrms face volatile marginal cost shocks can
also generate little synchronization of ﬁrms in response to economy-wide disturbances even if menu costs are time-invariant.
2turing sectors in order to test whether ﬁrm pricing is time or state-dependent. Unlike earlier, survey-based
studies, we rely on a larger sample of ﬁrms, spanning 40 years of data and a large subset of the US economy
in order to conduct inference. Our tests are based on the following premise. If ﬁrm pricing is state-dependent,
the ﬁrm’s decision to adjust is based on not only their idiosyncratic but also the aggregate shock in the econ-
omy. The ﬁrms for which the two types of disturbances reinforce each other and trigger desired price changes
in the same direction are more likely to adjust and pay the menu costs. Consider for example an environ-
ment in which ﬁrms face idiosyncratic technological disturbances as well as aggregate, monetary shocks. In
periods of monetary expansions, ﬁrms are more likely to adjust if idiosyncratic shocks reinforce the incentive
to increase prices arising from the monetary disturbance. Most of adjusting ﬁrms in such periods should
then be ﬁrms with negative technological shocks. In contrast, if pricing is time-dependent, the distribution
of technology shocks among adjusting ﬁrms should be irresponsive to economy-wide disturbances.
A direct test of this implication of state-dependent models requires ﬁrm-level data on actual prices
and technology (or other marginal cost) disturbances, data generally unavailable for a large segment of the
economy. We rely instead on sectoral price, input and output data available from the NBER Manufacturing
Productivity Database. We use this data to calculate a measure of technological disturbances based on sectoral
production function estimates that explicitly allow for increasing returns, imperfect competition and variable
capacity and labor utilization, using the approach of Basu and Kimball (1997). We use these measures of
technology shocks to ask whether economy-wide disturbances alter the responsiveness of sectoral inﬂation
rates to negative, relative to positive technology disturbances. We ﬁnd that they do: sectoral inﬂation rates
are much more responsive to negative, as opposed to positive technology shocks in periods with greater than
average aggregate inﬂation, larger changes in commodity prices and monetary policy shocks. This evidence
strongly supports the state-dependent hypothesis, as it implies that the timing of price changes is endogenous,
and responds to both aggregate and idiosyncratic (sectoral) shocks.
This paper is related to the work of Ball and Mankiw (1994,1995), Danziger (1999), as well as Golosov
and Lucas (2004). Ball and Mankiw (1994) show that in the presence of non-stochastic trend inﬂation,
an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks is inﬂationary, as most of the ﬁrms that adjust in an
environment with positive trend inﬂation and menu costs of price changes are ﬁrms that desire price increases.
3Similarly, changes in the skewness of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks can also cause movements in
the aggregate price level if pricing is state-dependent, as in Ball and Mankiw (1995). In contrast, this paper
studies a diﬀerent implication of state-dependent models, generated again by the endogenous timing of price
changes: we ask whether the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on adjustment, varies over
time in response to monetary and other types of aggregate disturbances. Danziger (1999) and Golosov and
Lucas (2004) study the general equilibrium implications of models with state-dependent pricing, idiosyncratic
technology shocks and aggregate monetary disturbances. An implication of these models is that money is
close to neutral, despite nominal rigidities at the ﬁrm level, a result arising from the asymmetric response of
ﬁrms hit by negative versus positive technology shocks to a monetary expansion3.A ni n c r e a s ei nt h em o n e y
supply forces adjustment by mostly negative-shock ﬁrms and acts as an adverse “supply” shock that oﬀsets
the expansionary eﬀect of the increase in real balances.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a partial equilibrium model in which
menu costs of price changes lead ﬁrms to follow state-dependent rules of price adjustment. We use the model
in order to validate our empirical approach: we use it to derive a proxy for the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks conditional on adjustment. In Section 3 we discuss the data we use in this paper and the methodology
used to calculate measures of technology shocks. Section 4 tests the state-dependent pricing model. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
2. A test of State-Dependent Pricing Models
In this section we discuss one source of asymmetry implied by the endogenous timing of ﬁrm price
adjustments in menu-cost models, an asymmetry that we explore in our empirical work in the next section.
To ﬁxi d e a s ,w eﬁrst discuss the source of asymmetry heuristically, and illustrate how the distribution of
idiosyncratic shocks among adjusting ﬁrms ﬂuctuates in response to economy-wide shocks. We then formally
solve a partial equilibrium problem in which a continuum of ﬁrms face idiosyncratic and sectoral technology
s h o c k s ,a sw e l la sm o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c k sa n di l l u s t r a t et h er o l eo ft h ea s y m m e t r i e sq u a n t i t a t i v e l y .
3Midrigan (2005) shows that 80% of the variability of inﬂation in a general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks, calibrated to match key features of the US micro-price data, is due to the endogenous variation of the identity of adjusting
ﬁrms in response to aggregate shocks.
4A. Heuristic Example
The logic behind out test of whether pricing is state or time-dependent is simple. Consider an industry
j, in which a continuum of ﬁrms, indexed by i, faces menu costs of changing their prices. We assume, to
build intuition, that ﬁrms follow simple, symmetric S-s pricing rules of price adjustment:
πijt = π∗
ijt if π∗
ijt / ∈ [−s,s]( 1 )
πijt =0 , o t h e r w i s e ,
π∗
ijt = uijt + εjt + gt,
where π∗
ijt is the ﬁrm’s desired price change in a frictionless world, πijt is the actual price change, s is the
maximum deviation of its price from the optimum that the ﬁrm tolerates, gt is an aggregate disturbance, εjt
an industry-wide shock, and uijt a ﬁrm-speciﬁc disturbance that captures both contemporaneous shocks to
the ﬁrm’s desired price, but also the history of all shocks since the previous price adjustment. As long as uijt
are centered around 0, and not too dispersed to drive most of the adjustment, ﬁrms in sectors in which the
sectoral εjt and aggregate shocks gt are of the same sign are more willing to change prices than sectors in
which the two shocks cancel each other out.
Letting Θ(εjt,g t)={uijt|uijt ≤− s − (gt + εjt)o ruijt >s− (gt + εjt)} denote the ﬁrm’s adjustment
region, the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts (which, invoking a law of large numbers, is also the fraction of ﬁrms
that adjust in a given sector) Fr(εjt,g t)=P r o b [ uijt ∈ Θ(εjt,g t)], increases if gt + εjt is large in absolute
value.
This observation suggests a way of testing whether ﬁrm pricing is state or time-dependent. What
diﬀerentiates the two approaches to modelling nominal rigidities is the fact that the timing of price changes is
exogenous in time-dependent models and thus unresponsive to idiosyncratic or aggregate disturbances. In the
language of the example above, the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts is independent of gt and εjt. In contrast,
state-dependent ﬁrms are more likely to adjust in a given period if gt + εjt has a large absolute value, i.e.,
the aggregate and sectoral shock trigger desired price changes in the same direction.
To test the prediction above using data available for the US economy, we need a proxy for the fraction
5of adjusting ﬁrms in a given sector. We use the fact that, in a sticky price model, sectoral inﬂation rates are
more responsive to sectoral and aggregate shocks the larger the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting in this sector. To
see this, let πjt = 1
N
PN
i=1 πijt be the inﬂation rate of sector j. Substituting the policy rule assumed above
into this expression yields





uijtI(uijt ∈ Θ(εjt,g t)), (2)
where I is an indicator function. The ﬁrst term in this expression is the fraction of adjusters times the
desired price change arising from aggregate or sectoral disturbances. The second term is a “selection bias”
term: ﬁrms are more likely to adjust if their idiosyncratic shocks are aligned with εjt and gt. We will employ
a regression of sectoral inﬂation rates on aggregate and sectoral disturbances:
πjt = Γ(εjt,g t)(εjt + gt) + errorjt, (3)
where Γ(εjt,g t) is a non-linear function of the two disturbances, in order to test the state-dependent model.
Although Γ(εjt,g t) in such a regression provides an estimate of Fr(εjt,g t) that is upward biased, because of
the selection term in (2) above, note that we are not interested in the fraction of adjusters itself, but rather
in the properties of the set Θ(εjt,g t). If pricing is indeed state-dependent, and aggregate and sectoral shocks
reinforce each other, a sector’s responsiveness to observable disturbances, Γ(εjt,g t), increases both because
the fraction of adjusters in the industry increases, but also because the ﬁrms that do adjust are those whose
idiosyncratic shocks, uijt, trigger desired price changes in the same direction as sectoral and aggregate shocks.
In contrast, if the timing of price changes is exogenous, Γ(εjt,g t) is constant in its two arguments.
Our empirical approach is therefore based on estimating elasticities that capture the responsiveness
of sectoral inﬂation rates to sectoral technology shocks and aggregate monetary disturbances, and testing
whether these elasticities are a non-linear function of the two types of shocks. Our null hypothesis is that
the inﬂation rates in equation (3) are a linear function of disturbances, i.e., that ﬁr m sc h a n g ep r i c e si na
time-dependent fashion. Non-linearities in the responsiveness of ﬁrms to shocks can arise however even if the
timing of price changes is exogenous, but price functions, conditional on adjustment, are non-linear, contrary
6to what we have assumed in (1) above. The model of the next subsection provides a formal justiﬁcation for
the empirical approach in this paper. In particular, we solve two sticky price models, one in which ﬁrms
set prices in a Calvo (1983) fashion, and another one, in which menu costs of price changes are responsible
for nominal rigidities. We solve the two models using projection-based functional approximation techniques
that explicitly allow for non-linearities and calibrate the models in order to allow them to match important
features of the micro-price data, stressed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004) and Golosov and Lucas (2004). We
ﬁnd that non-linearities in the pricing function of a Calvo-type ﬁrm are absent, which implies that an estimate
of equation (3) using data generated by a simulation of a time-dependent model contains no non-linear terms.
In contrast, non-linearities are evident in a state-dependent setup, suggesting that the intuition developed
above holds in a more realistic class of models than the simple illustrative example considered above.
B. A Partial Equilibrium Model
Our model is similar to the partial equilibrium problem studied by Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). We
allow however the general price level to grow at a stochastic, possibly negative, rate and assume that in
addition to aggregate shocks, ﬁrms face idiosyncratic and aggregate disturbances to their marginal costs. Let
¯ pt be the general price level in the economy, assumed to evolve exogenously, according to ¯ pt =¯ pt−1egt, where
the growth rate of the price level is driven by gt = α + δgt−1 + ηt,w i t hηt ∼ N(0,σ2
η). We interpret ηt as
monetary policy shocks. Letting zt =
pt
¯ pt, where pt is the ﬁrm’s nominal price and zt its real price, we assume
constant elasticity demand functions: qt = z
−θ
t .








at is the (real) marginal cost
of production, and at is the ﬁrm’s technology4.T h e ﬁrm’s technology is the product of an idiosyncratic
and sectoral component: at = ψtφt, which evolve according to log(ψt)=ρlog(ψt−1)+εt and log(φt)=
ρlog(φt−1)+ut, where εt is a sectoral and ut a ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology shock. We assume for simplicity
that the two components of a ﬁrm’s technology have the same degree of serial correlation, and the shocks are
d r a w nf r o maG a u s s i a nd i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm e a n0a n dv a r i a n c eσ2
ε and σ2
u , respectively.
4We supress the sector and ﬁrm subscripts to conserve notation and revert to them below when needed.
7State-Dependent Pricing
In this setup ﬁrms face costs of adjusting nominal prices. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm incurs cost ξ5 every
















where I() is an indicator function.
Let V a(z−1,ψ,φ,g),Vn(z−1,ψ,φ,g)d e n o t et h eﬁrm’s value of adjusting and not adjusting its nominal
price, respectively, where z−1 is the ﬁrm’s last period’s relative price: pt−1/¯ pt−1.L e t V =m a x ( V a,Vn)
denote the ﬁrm’s value function and st =( zt−1,ψt,φt,g t) collect the state variables. The solution to the
ﬁrm’s problem satisﬁes the following system of functional equations:






































where F( )i st h ej o i n tc d fo ft h et h r e es h o c k s ,a n ds0() is the law of motion for the state variables. The real
price the ﬁrm faces at the start of the next period is equal to either z0
−1 = z if the ﬁrm adjusts the nominal





In this exercise we assume that ﬁrms have no control over the timing of their price changes. Rather,
the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts in a given period is constant, and equal to λ. The two functional equations
5We interpret menu costs as costs of physically changing the price and transmitting the information about the price change
to the consumer. Zbaracki et. al (2004) ﬁnd that these costs are non-trivial. For example, costs of transmitting the information
regarding price changes to consumers constitute 0.4% and 1.8% of total revenues and operating expenses, respectively, for the
ﬁrm in their study.
8characterizing the ﬁrm’s problem in this setup are:






































where V (s)=λV a(s)+( 1− λ)V n(s).
To solve these problems, we employ collocation, a functional approximation technique. The idea
behind this method is to approximate the two value functions with a linear combination of orthogonal (we
employ Chebyshev) polynomials and solve for the unknown coeﬃcients by requiring that the two equations
are satisﬁed exactly at a number of nodes along the state-space. A technical appendix discusses the solution
method and its accuracy in more detail.
We assign the model parameter values to ensure that the predictions of the state-dependent model
match certain features of the US economy. The length of the period is a month. We interpret shocks to
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ep r i c el e v e la sm o n e t a r ys h o c k sand calibrate this process by estimating an AR(1)
process for the monthly growth rate of the US money supply6. The elasticity of demand, θ,i sc h o s e ns ot h a t
the steady-state markup is equal to 25%7. We assume that idiosyncratic and sectoral technology shocks are
equally volatile8,a n dc a l i b r a t et h es i z eo ft h em e n uc o s t sξ and the volatility of technology shocks to ensure
that ﬁrms adjust on average every ﬁve months and, when they do so, change prices by ±10.5% on average9.
We set ρ =0 .8 for the experiments reported in this paper, but our results are robust to alternative choices of
the degree of serial correlation in technology. In particular, we have also experimented with iid and unit-root
6M1data, 1959 to 2004. There is substantial noise in the growth rate of the money supply at the monthly frequency, which
biases downward the AR(1) coeﬃcient of the growth rate of the money supply. Results are robust however in simulations of
the model using diﬀerent degrees of serial correlation in gt, or a more appropriate ARMA(1,1) process for gt. We have also
experimented with an AR(1) process for the growth rate of the US CPI and obtained similar results to those reported below.
7This number is in line with elasticity of substitution estimates in earlier work, which range from θ =3t oθ =6 . See Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2000) for a brief survey.
8We have redone our work by assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are ﬁve times more volatile than sectoral shocks. In this
case the results discussed below are weaker (because the importance of the “selection bias” term associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc( a s
opposed to aggregate or sectoral) shocks increases), but still statistically signiﬁcant. In a sense, the empirical approach of this
paper tests the joint hypothesis that pricing is state-dependent and that sectoral shocks suﬃciently large relative to idiosyncratic
shocks for us to be able to discern the non-linearities implied by state-dependent pricing rules.
9These numbers are similar to those reported by Bils and Klenow (2002) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004), based on two
large datasets of consumer prices made available by BLS.
9technology processes and found similar results. The probability that a Calvo ﬁrm adjusts in a given period
is chosen so that the state and time-dependent models predict the same frequency of price changes: λ = .2.
The table below summarizes the parameter values we use. The menu cost, ξ, is equal to 0.0132c,t h a t
is, 1.32% of the ﬁrm’s steady-state total cost of production.




.997 1.9×10−3 0.55 2.75×10−5 0.8 1.1×10−3 0.0132c 5
We start by discussing the price functions that solve the ﬁrm’s problem. Figure 1 plots the optimal
price (conditional on adjustment) of a ﬁrm, expressed as the log-deviation of the ﬁrm’s real price from its
steady-state optimum: log(zt/( θ
θ−1c)), as a function of the ﬁrm’s technology, for two values of the growth rate
of the price level. Note two diﬀerences in the pricing functions of a Calvo and state-dependent ﬁrm. First,
a state-dependent ﬁrm responds more strongly to a technology shock (the elasticity is close to -1, similar to
w h a ti tw o u l db ei naﬂexible price model in which prices are a constant markup over marginal cost) than
Calvo ﬁrms do (the elasticity is close to -.5). Second, Calvo ﬁrms respond more aggressively to an increase
in the growth rate of the price level than state-dependent ﬁrms do. These diﬀerences in price functions arise
because of the type of nominal frictions Calvo and menu cost ﬁrms are subject to. If a Calvo ﬁrm ﬁnds itself
with a suboptimal price in a given period in the future, it pays dearly: given that it will not re-adjust its
price for an average of 5 months, it will incur losses from the suboptimal price for a number of periods to
come. In contrast, a state-dependent ﬁrm can always choose to pay the menu cost and reprice: its losses
from having a suboptimal price in future periods are smaller than those of a time-dependent ﬁrm. This in
turn implies that a Calvo ﬁrm has a stronger incentive to oﬀset future expected changes in its marginal cost
every time it adjusts than a state-dependent ﬁrm does. Calvo ﬁrms therefore respond less aggressively to a
technology shock (as the level of technology, by assumption, reverts to its mean), and more aggressively to
as h o c kt ot h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ep r i c el e v e l( b e c a u s et h ep r i c el e v e lg r o w t hr a t ei ss e r i a l l yc o r r e l a t e da n d
ah i g hi n ﬂation rate today predicts higher than average inﬂation in future periods). We illustrate this idea
graphically in Figure 2: a ﬁrm’s value of inaction is much more responsive to deviation of its past price from
the optimum if a ﬁrm is subject to Calvo-type frictions than menu costs of adjusting prices. For this reason,
state-dependent ﬁr m sb e h a v ea si ft h e yd i s c o u n tt h ef u t u r el e s st h a nC a l v oﬁrms do and set a price that
10resembles the price they would charge in a ﬂexible price world.
The most important lesson to be learned from the discussion above is that in both Calvo and state-
dependent pricing models, a ﬁrm that decides to adjust its price responds in a linear fashion to aggregate
and sectoral disturbances. As Figure 1 indicates, the slope of the ﬁrm’s optimal price in its technology level
is constant, and moreover, unaﬀected by the size of the aggregate disturbance. Non-linearities in the sector’s
responsiveness to sectoral and aggregate shocks may only arise, then, if the fraction of adjusting ﬁrms and
their identity varies endogenously, as in a state-dependent model10.
Figure 3 plots the fraction of adjusters Fr(εjt,g t) in a sector hit by a technology shock εjt
11,a sa
function of the growth rate of the general price level, for the state-dependent pricing model. Consider ﬁrst
sectors subject to negative technology disturbances (ε = −.07 and ε = −.04). Firms in these sectors desire,
on average, to increase their prices in order to respond to the higher marginal costs of production. This
incentive to change prices is reinforced if the economy-wide nominal shock is also positive. For this reason,
the fraction of ﬁrms that adjusts in sectors with negative technology shocks increases in g,t h eg r o w t hr a t e
of the general price level. Note also the diﬀerence in the slope of Fr(): an increase in g has a stronger eﬀect
on the fraction of adjusters in sectors subject to more negative technology disturbances.
In contrast, ﬁrms in sectors with positive technology shocks see their marginal cost falling and desire
price decreases. Their desire to decrease real prices is automatically satisﬁed if the aggregate price level
increases, thereby eroding the ﬁrm’s real price. The fraction of ﬁrms that adjusts in sectors with positive
technology disturbances therefore decreases as the growth rate of the economy-wide price level rises. Note
again the diﬀerence in slopes: the larger the sector’s technology shock is, the larger the eﬀect aggregate
disturbances will have on the fraction of adjusters in this particular industry.
The results presented in Figure 3 are not useful for empirical purposes, as we do not directly observe the
fraction of ﬁrms that adjust in a given sector. We therefore estimate elasticities that capture the responsiveness
of sectoral inﬂation rates to shocks and ask whether these elasticities vary in the data in a non-linear fashion.
10Asymmetries in a state-dependent model can arise for reasons other than ﬂuctuations in the fraction and identity of adjusters
in response to aggregate disturbances. For example, more productive ﬁrms are more willing to adjust prices as they prefer to
“make hay while the sun is shining” — see the discussion in Golosov and Lucas (2004). These asymmetries are however absent
in time-dependent models, which is the null hypothesis maintained in this paper.
11To calculate this statistic, we initialize the economy at its non-stochastic steady-state and integrate the decision rules of the
ﬁrms in the industry by employing a Monte-Carlo simulation in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks are drawn from N(0,σ2
u).
11We use model-simulated data and estimate a panel regression of sectoral inﬂation rates against technology
shocks and aggregate disturbances, a regression in which we allow elasticities to diﬀer across observations
with negative and positive sectoral technology shocks, and also according to whether the growth rate of the
price level belongs to one of the 6 quantiles of its distribution.
πit = γ(ε,g)εit + βgt + uit (6)
where γ(ε,g) takes on 12 diﬀerent values depending on the whether ε is positive or negative, and the quantile
of the distribution g belongs to12. Figure 4 plots the absolute values of the estimated elasticities on technology
shocks, γ(ε,g), in the g space, for both the state and time-dependent models. Note in the left panel of the
ﬁgure that, when the growth rate of the price level is low, the estimated elasticity is 0.64 in absolute value for
sectors subject to negative technology disturbances, and 0.78 for sectors with positive technology shocks. As
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ep r i c el e v e li n c r e a s e s ,ﬁrms in sectors with ε < 0 are more willing to adjust prices and
the elasticity increases to 0.82. In contrast, the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust in positive shock sectors falls with
the growth rate of prices, and their elasticity drops to 0.60 when aggregate shocks are in the upper quantile of
their distribution. Note in the right panel of the ﬁgure that these elasticities are, given the exogenous timing
of price changes and lack of non-linearities in the price function, constant in the time-dependent model. They
are also much smaller, both because of the disincentive of Calvo ﬁrms to respond to shocks that are expected
to mean-revert, but also because of the lack of a selection bias in a time-dependent model.
A more compact way to summarize the eﬀect of aggregate and sectoral shocks on the responsiveness of
sectoral inﬂation to disturbances is to simply look at the diﬀerence between the elasticities of sectoral inﬂation
with respect to technology shocks in sectors with negative and positive technology shocks, as a function of
the aggregate disturbance. To this end, we estimate the following period-by-period regressions:
πit = c + γN
t εitI(εit<0)+γP
t εitI(εit>0)+uit (7)
12One can also allow the responsiveness to aggregate shocks,g t, to vary non-linearly as well, but the fact that technology shocks,
in both the model and the data, are much more volatile than nominal disturbances makes them a more suitable candidate for
identifying the fraction and identity of ﬁrms that adjust in a given sector.
12where γN
t and γP
t are the elasticities of sectoral inﬂation rates to positive and negative technology shocks in
each period and I an indicator function. Figure 5 presents a scatter plot of γP
t − γN
t as a function of the
growth rate of the general price level in each period. Note that the diﬀerence in elasticities increases in the
price level growth rate in the state-dependent model (the diﬀerence in the absolute value of elasticities falls
as ﬁrms in sectors with positive technology disturbances adjust less willingly), while it is ﬂat in the Calvo
model.
Finally, we can allow the responsiveness of sectoral inﬂation rates to technology shocks to vary more
continuously with the size of the sectoral technology shock and aggregate disturbances. Let
πit = γ0 + Γ(εit,g t)(−εit)+γ3gt + uit, (8)
where Γ(ε,g) is a function that captures the responsiveness of a sector’s inﬂation rate to aggregate and
sectoral shocks due to changes in the fraction of adjusters, but also their identity, in response to disturbances.




as ﬁrms are more willing to change prices if sectoral technology shocks and aggregate disturbances reinforce
each other and trigger desired price changes in the same direction. To capture this cross-partial derivative,
we parameterize Γ(ε,g)=γ1 − γ2 (ε × g), where γ2 is expected to have a positive sign if pricing is state-
dependent. Our test of state-dependent pricing can be based on the following regression:





+ γ3gt + uit (9)
133. Measures of technology shocks
A. Data
We test the predictions of the state-dependent pricing model using annual data from 1958 to 1996 for
446 4-digit SIC industries from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database13. The data is derived from
various government sources, notably the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufacturing, and contains
information on total shipments, materials expenditure, investment, capital stock, number of production and
non-production workers, payroll, production worker hours and wages, as well as price deﬂators for shipments,
materials etc. for each industry. Material expenditures include expenditure on energy, and the deﬂator for
materials accounts for movements in the price of energy. Bils and Chang (1999) is a recent example that
uses this dataset in order to ask how industry prices respond to variations in costs and production, although,
given our focus on asymmetries in response to purely technological shocks, our approach diﬀers from theirs
along several dimensions. We use this data in order to conduct our empirical exercises as discussed below.
B. Measuring technology shocks
Our measures of technology shocks are Solow (1957) residuals estimated using the methodology devel-
oped by Hall (1990) and Basu and Kimball (1997) in order to account for the possibility of increasing returns,
imperfect competition and variable input utilization, respectively.
We assume a diﬀerentiable production function in which ﬁrms produce output Y , using capital services
˜ K, labor services ˜ L, intermediate inputs of materials and energy M according to:
Y = F( ˜ K, ˜ L,M,A)
Capital services depend on the stock of capital K, but also capital utilization Z : ˜ K = ZK, while labor
services depend on the number of workers N, hours worked per employee H and each worker’s eﬀort level
E : ˜ L = ENH. Taking logarithms of this production function, totally diﬀerentiating, and invoking cost
13The data is available at http://www.nber.org/nberces/nbprod96.htm and is discussed extensively in Bartelsman and Gray
(1996). The industries are those deﬁned in the 1972 Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation. We drop two industries that have missing
observations for several years.
14minimization, one obtains:
dy = µ[skdk + sL(dn + dh)+smdm]+µ[skdz + sLde]+da
where lower case letters denote logs, sj is the share of factor j in total revenue and µ is the markup . The
diﬃculty in estimating this equation directly is that eﬀort and capital utilization are not observed. We
follow Basu and Kimball (1997) and proxy the unobserved input utilization with hours per worker dh14. The
justiﬁcation for this approach is that ﬁrms operate along all margins simultaneously, and given convex costs of
changing hours worked, eﬀort and capital utilization, will choose to change them simultaneously in response
to a shock. Changes in hours worked are therefore correlated with unobserved capital utilization and eﬀort.
More formally, Basu and Fernald (2000) solve a dynamic cost minimization problem of a ﬁrm subject to
costs of changing employment levels, hours worked and capital utilization, and show that as long as capital’s
depreciation rate does not depend on its utilization level and the production function is Cobb-Douglas, a
log-linear approximation to the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions implies that dz and de depend on dh only15.W e
therefore estimate
∆yit = ci + µ∆xit + γ∆hit +˜ εit (10)
where ∆yit is the change in the log output of industry i, ∆xit is the share-weighted sum of the growth rate
of real inputs (labor, capital, materials and energy). We calculate total output as shipments plus change in
end-of-period inventories and deﬂa t ei tu s i n gt h ep r i c ed e ﬂator for shipments. The Productivity Database
distinguishes between production and non-production workers in reporting industry employment, and only
reports hours data for production workers. We use the two as separate inputs in the production function and
assume that hours per worker are time-invariant for non-production workers. Our results are robust to an
14Conley and Dupor (1999) use an alternative proxy for capital utilization, one based on electricity consumption. Electricity
data is not available however at the 4-digit level of disaggregation.
15Allowing for depreciation rates to increase with capital utilization, as in Basu and Kimball (1997) complicates the problem
as utilization will depend on material inputs, capital stock, investment and the relative price of materials and investment:
dz = A(d(pm − pI)+dm − dk)+B(di − dk). where pm −pI is the relative price of materials and investment, i and k are
investment and the stock of capital, respectively, A and B are constants. We have used this alternative proxy for capital
utilization and found results to be very similar to those reported in text.
15alternative measure of inputs that includes only production workers. Our proxy for variable input utilization,
∆hi, is the log-diﬀerence in hours per worker reported for production workers.
We calculate the share of each factor of productiona st h et i m e - s e r i e sa v e r a g eo ft o t a lp a y m e n t st o
each factor divided by total revenues in each industry. One could in principle depart from this Cobb-Douglas
assumption of constant shares and allow shares to vary over time, but, as Basu and Fernald (2000) argue,
this approach increases the likelihood of misspeciﬁcation because observed factor prices are not allocative
period-by-period in a world with implicit contracts or quasi-ﬁxity16. To calculate payments to capital, we
ﬁrst calculate the user cost of capital, R, according to17:
R =( r + δ)
1 − ITC − τd
1 − τ
where r is the required rate of return on capital (we follow Hall (1990) and assume it equal to the S&P
500 dividend yield), δ is the depreciation rate, ITC is the investment tax credit, d is the present-value of
depreciation allowances and τ is the corporate income tax rate. Jorgenson and Yun (1991) provide data
on ITC, d and δ for 53 types of capital goods, while the tax data is provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis at the 2-digit level of disaggregation. We calculate the user cost of capital for each asset and a
weighted average over the diﬀerent types of assets for each SIC 2 industry in the dataset, with the weights
reﬂecting the relative importance of each type of asset in each industry. We judge the relative importance
of the diﬀerent types of assets in each industry by using Bureau of Economic Analysis data on the 1982
Distribution of New Structures and Equipment to using industries. The required payment to capital is ﬁnally
calculated as RPkK where PkK is the current-dollar value of the industry’s stock of capital18.G i v e n t h a t
the Database only reports wage and salary costs of labor, we follow Bils and Chang (1999) and magnify both
production and non-production labor costs to account for employer pension payments and compensation
beneﬁts. This data is again based on information available in the underlying NIPA tables at the 2-digit level
of disaggregation. In addition, we magnify total labor costs (for both production and non-production workers)
16Our results are robust however to an alternative speciﬁcation in which factor shares vary over time and are equal to average
shares in adjacent periods.
17See Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
18We also follow Bils and Chang (1999) and, given the low level of proﬁts in manufacturing, calculate capital’s share residually,
assuming that the shares of all inputs sum to one. Results are robust to this alternative assumption.
16by 9% to account for the database’s exclusion of payments to auxiliary and support personnel. Bartelsman
and Gray (1996) report that these costs account for 7.9% and 10.7% of total payroll in manufacturing in 1972
and 1986 respectively.
OLS estimates of (10) are likely to be biased because of the correlation between technology shocks
and input choices. We therefore instrument the right-hand side variables using current and one period lags of
deﬂated oil price changes, changes in government spending, changes in the US eﬀective nominal exchange rate
and monetary policy shocks estimated using a 7-variable VAR according to the Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1999) block-recursive identiﬁcation procedure19. Our instruments are similar to those used by Basu
and Kimball (1997), to which we add a measure of changes in nominal exchange rates of US against its trading
partners. Given the exchange rate disconnect puzzle documented in open-economy macroeconomics20,i ti s
unlikely that sectoral technology shocks are correlated with this variable21.
The relatively short span of time-series observations renders industry by industry estimates of the
coeﬃcients in (10) rather imprecise. We therefore pool 2-digit industries together and estimate (10) using a
panel (ﬁxed-eﬀects) 2SLS estimator for each SIC 2 industry22.
C. Relationship with other evidence
In this subsection we brieﬂy discuss our measure of sectoral technology shocks and relate our results
to those in earlier work. In Table 1 we report the time-series standard deviation (averaged across all sectors)
of two measures of technology shocks. The ﬁrst measure we report is the change in the TFP series reported
in the NBER Productivity database. This TFP measure assumes perfect competition and constant returns
to scale and simply subtracts the share-weighted sum of the growth rates of inputs from the growth rate
of real output. The other measure are the puriﬁed Solow residuals whose construction is discussed above:
εit =˜ εit + ci. Note that technology shocks are very volatile at this level of disaggregation, with a standard
deviation of 0.076 for the traditional Solow residuals and 0.063 for the technology shocks puriﬁed of imperfect
19We measure the stance of monetary policy by the size of non-borrowed reserves and assume that the Fed’s information set
includes current and four lagged values of real GDP, CPI, an index of commodity prices, as well as four lags of the Federal funds
rate, total reserves, non-borrowed reserves and the M1 money stock. Monetary policy shocks are estimated using quarterly data.
Our measure of annual shocks is the sum of four quarterly shocks.
20e.g, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996)
21Our results are robust to excluding nominal exchange rate variables as an instrument for input growth.
22Our results are robust however to estimating technology shocks using separate industry-by-industry regressions.
17competition, increasing returns and variable input utilization. In contrast, Basu and Fernald (2000) estimate
that technology shocks in the entire manufacturing sector are almost twice less volatile: the standard deviation
of the Solow residual is 0.035 and that of the puriﬁed series is 0.028 according to their estimates.
In Table 2 we compare our estimates of decreasing returns to scale implied by our estimates of (10)
to those in Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2004) who use the Jorgenson dataset of 29 industries (including 21
industries at (roughly) the SIC 2 level) from 1949 to 199623. Their estimation strategy diﬀers slightly from
ours as they restrict the coeﬃcient on the proxy for input utilization to be constant across industries, but,
despite the diﬀerences in the level of aggregation underlying the two sets of estimates, our results and theirs
are not too dissimilar. For durable goods, the median returns to scale estimate is 1.11, compared to 1.07 in
their work, with a correlation of 0.71 across coeﬃcient estimates in the diﬀerent industries. Our results diﬀer
somewhat for non-durable goods, but the low correlation between the two sets of estimates (0.41) is misleading
as it is driven by two estimates of returns to scale that are insigniﬁcant (0.32 for Food in our sample and
0.11 for Leather in their work). The correlation between these elasticities for all other non-durable sectors
is much higher, around 0.77. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the median degree of returns to scale
in our work: 1.07 and theirs: 0.89 for non-durable ﬁrms24, but our results are in the range of those obtained
using other sets of data or instrument sets25.
4. Testing the State-Dependent Pricing Model
A. Empirical Results
Before we discuss our empirical approach, we ﬁrst use our estimates of technology shocks εit =˜ εit +ci
constructed above26,t oe s t i m a t e
23BFK(2004) estimate elasticities separately for SIC 371 and all other SIC 37 sectors. We calculate a weighted average of their
two estimates for the SIC37 division: Transportation Equipment.
24Conley and Dupor (1999) ﬁnd similar return to scale estimates to those in BFK (2004) (1.06 for durables and 0.91 for non-
durables) using a spatial GMM estimator that models the covariance of technology shocks across industries non-parametrically
as a function of economic distances for SIC 2 manufacturing industries using a set of instrument similar to ours.
25eg., Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) ﬁnd returns to scale in non-durable manufacturing equal to 1.13
26Throughout this paper, our deﬁnition of a sector’s technology shock is the sum of the “puriﬁed Solow” residuals in equation
(10) plus the ﬁxed-eﬀect term that captures the long-run rate of growth of an industry’s technology. We choose this deﬁnition
because in the model, both expected and unexpected changes in an industry’s technology level aﬀect the ﬁrms’ desired prices and
their responsiveness to shocks. It turns our however that variability in the ﬁxed eﬀect terms (ci) is much smaller than period-
by-period shocks to a sector’s technology level (˜ εit). All our results therefore change little if we use the residuals themselves as
a measure of technology shocks.
18πit = γN
t εitIεit<0 + γ
p
tεitIεit>0 + uit (11)
for each time-period using ordinary least squares, where πit are sectoral inﬂation rates. On average, the
elasticities on negative and positive shocks are equal to each other over time (-.30 for negative, and -.31 for
positive shocks), but vary substantially across periods. In Figure 6 we present a scatter plot of the diﬀerence
in elasticities γP
t − γN
t against shocks to aggregate inﬂation, measured by the change in the CPI inﬂation
rate ∆πt (left panel) as well as against changes in a measure of commodity prices27.C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e
implications of the state-dependent pricing model, periods in which aggregate shocks increase the average









¯ ¯ is smaller), i.e., the responsiveness of sectoral inﬂation rates to technology shocks is
larger in sectors in which the shocks are negative. Unless there are non-linearities in the adjusting ﬁrm’s
optimal pricing functions (in Section 2 we have shown that this is not the case) that cause ﬁrms to respond
stronger to negative technology shocks in times of higher inﬂation, these ﬁgures are evidence that ﬁrms that
adjust in times of higher than average inﬂation are more likely to be ﬁrms that experience negative technology
shocks. This in turn suggests that a given ﬁrm’s decision to adjust is state-dependent.
Note that we use changes in economy-wide CPI inﬂation, ∆πt, as opposed to the level of inﬂation
as a measure of nominal disturbances. We do so because several structural breaks characterize the process
for the US inﬂation rate over the sample considered in our empirical work. Structural breaks can aﬀect our
results for two reasons. First, ﬁrms are more likely to adjust prices in high-inﬂation environments, as in the
1970s and 1980s: the fraction of adjusting ﬁrms can increase in all sectors of the economy, regardless of the
sector’s technology disturbance. Second, structural breaks aﬀect the ﬁrm’s pricing functions and their inaction
regions. For example, in periods of high inﬂation ﬁrms front-load and over-adjust prices in anticipation of
expected future increases in the general price level. Moreover, they are more willing to tolerate prices that
are above the optimum, as a rise in the aggregate price level is expected to erode the ﬁrm’s real price in
the future. If a structural break occurs, and inﬂation rates fall to a lower level, albeit a positive one, some
ﬁrms would ﬁnd themselves with prices that are too high, relative to what is optimal and acceptable in the
27We use the Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index. The data is available online at
http://www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/charts.xls
19new environment, and would ﬁnd it optimal to lower prices, and do so more readily if subject to a favorable
technology shock28. We will show below, that although weaker, results of our empirical work are consistent
with the predictions of the state-dependent model even when the level of inﬂa t i o ni su s e da sam e a s u r eo f
nominal disturbance.
To formally test the signiﬁcance of the correlation between the diﬀerence in the responsiveness of ﬁrms




t are linear functions of the aggregate shock St :
γN
t = β0 + β1St,
γP
t = α0 + α1St,
and estimate the following panel speciﬁcation:
πit = ξi + γP
t I(εit>0)εit + γN
t I(εit<0)εit + ρSt + uit,
which, given the parametrization of elasticities above, reduces to








εit + ρSt + uit. (12)
where ξi are sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Given the estimates of β1 and α1, as well as the variance-covariance
matrix of the coeﬃcient estimates above29, Table 3 reports our estimates of α1 − β1,t h ed i ﬀerence in
elasticities due to a 1% aggregate disturbance for diﬀerent measures of aggregate shocks.
In Table 3, columns 1 and 2, our estimates of β1 and α1 are based on actual and ﬁrst-diﬀerenced CPI
inﬂation. Consistent with the evidence in Figure 6, the absolute value of the coeﬃcient on positive technology
shocks decreases relative to the one on negative technology shocks in times of higher inﬂation (i.e., α1 − β1
increases), suggesting that the fraction of ﬁrms who adjust in sectors hit by negative technology shocks is
28See Ahlin and Shintani (2004) for a formal theoretical exposition of this idea.
29G i v e nt h et w o - s t a g ee s t i m a t i o np r o c e d u r ew ee m p l o y ,c l a s s i c a ls t a n d a r de r r o r sa r ed o w n w a r db i a s e di no u re x a m p l e . T h e
procedure we use to compute correct asymptotic standard errors is discussed in the appendix.
20larger in these periods than the corresponding fraction in industries hit by favorable technology shocks30.
Ball and Mankiw (1995) discuss an alternative source of asymmetries in state-dependent pricing mod-
els. They show that if the distribution of all the ﬁrms’ desired prices is, say, positively skewed, then, if the Ss
bands of price adjustment are symmetric, as in a world with no aggregate uncertainty, the fraction of ﬁrms
who adjust and increase prices is greater than the fraction of ﬁrms who lower prices. Hence, even if the distri-
bution of idiosyncratic shocks is centered at zero in all periods, shocks to the third moment of the distribution
will force an asymmetric adjustment by ﬁrms to positive versus negative shocks and generate economy-wide




while in their model, exogenous shocks to γ
p
t − γN
t aﬀect aggregate inﬂation31. Their analysis does suggest
however, that, if our measures of technology shocks are imperfect, and correlated with, say, changes in energy
prices that aﬀect some sectors at the expense of others, or if the skewness of the distribution of technology
shocks changes over time32,t h e nγ
p
t − γN
t movements induced by these changes will on their own generate
economy-wide inﬂation. In other words, our estimates of β and α could be biased because of endogeneity.
To distinguish between these two sources of asymmetry, we next look at alternative measures of shocks to all
ﬁrm’s desired prices, namely, exogenous monetary policy shocks and changes in commodity prices.
The third column of Table 3 relates the diﬀerence in elasticities to changes in commodity prices.
Support for the state-dependent pricing model is strong with this measure of aggregate shocks as well. The
coeﬃcient estimate of the eﬀect of an increase in commodity price inﬂa t i o no nt h ed i ﬀerence in elasticities is
equal to 2.5 with a t-statistic well in excess of 10.
Columns 4-6 of Table 3 asks whether monetary policy shocks aﬀect the responsiveness of ﬁrm prices
to negative, as opposed to positive idiosyncratic technology shocks. The lag with which shocks to monetary
policy aﬀect variables in the US economy prompts us to relate the diﬀerence in elasticities to current but also
30We report the eﬀect of aggregate shocks on the diﬀerence in elasticities, as opposed to elasticities themselves in order to save
space, but also to control for changes in the fraction of all adjusting ﬁrms, say due to synchronization, in periods with greater
economy-wide disturbances. The distinction turns out to play little role. For most measures of aggregate disturbances we use,
β1 a r en e g a t i v ea n dα1 are positive, and highly signiﬁcant. The only exception arises in the case of aggregate inﬂation, πt,: α1 is
negative (although smaller than β1 in absolute value), contrary to what the model predicts, suggesting that in periods of higher
aggregate inﬂation the fraction of ﬁrms that adjusts increases in all sectors, although much more so in sectors with negative
technology shocks, as predicted by the state-dependent model.
31Similarly, exogenous increases in the volatility of sectoral shocks will generate aggregate inﬂation in a model with constant
trend money growth, as in Ball and Mankiw (1994).
32Although, including the skeweness of technology shocks in each period as an additional right-hand side variables does not
alter our results.
21several lags of past monetary shocks. We use three measures of shifts in the stance of monetary policy. Our
ﬁrst measure of shocks is estimated using the Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) recursive identiﬁca-
tion assumption, with non-borrowed reserves as the postulated instrument. A second measure we use are the
dates identiﬁed by Romer and Romer (1994) using the narrative approach, dates on which the Fed announced
an intent to reduce inﬂation by pursuing a contractionary monetary policy33. Although this measure does
not constitute an exogenous shift in monetary policy, it represents a measure of aggregate disturbances that
do not arise due to shifts in the responsiveness of ﬁrms to positive as opposed to negative technology shocks.
Our third measure of shocks is due to Romer and Romer (2004). To arrive at a measure of exogenous shifts
in monetary policy, Romer and Romer (2004) ﬁrst construct a series of intended changes in the federal funds
target rate around the FOMC meetings using both the narrative approach as well as information on the
Federal Fund’s expected rate based on internal Fed memos. This series of intended policy actions is then
purged of changes that arise in response to anticipated macroeconomic conditions by regressing it against
“Greenbook” forecasts of future inﬂation, real output growth and the unemployment rate.
As the lower panel of Table 3 indicate, results based on the alternative measures of monetary distur-
bances are remarkably robust. Consistent with the evidence documented in earlier work, monetary policy
shocks aﬀect inﬂation rates only with a lag. The eﬀect of an expansionary shock in the ﬁrst year is to decrease
the willingness of ﬁrms to respond to negative technology shock, a result inconsistent with the predictions of
the model and related to the “price puzzle” documented in earlier work. The response of elasticities to lags
of monetary policy shocks is however in line with the predictions of the model: following a lag, monetary
policy shocks increase the willingness of ﬁrms to increase prices, but do so asymmetrically: ﬁrms in sectors
with negative technology shocks adjust more readily. The maximal impact of the monetary shocks occurs
with a lag of two/three years and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (t-ratios are in excess of 5) in all cases.
We have established above the statistical signiﬁcance of state-dependent pricing terms in explaining
ﬂuctuations in sectoral inﬂation rates. We next ask whether their eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant as well.
We use our estimates of equation (12) and calculate, in Table 4, the eﬀect of a one standard deviation
33Five Romer-Romer dates lie in the period we consider: 68/12, 74/04, 78/08, 79/09, 88/12. Given that our data is yearly,
our measure of shocks are dummies for 69,74,79,80,89.
22nominal disturbance on the elasticity of sectoral inﬂation to negative/positive technology shocks. We ﬁrst
calculate what the elasticities γN
t and γP
t would be in the absence of economy-wide disturbances, when the
aggregate variables are at their time-series means: these are the estimates of α0 + α1µ(S)a n dβ0 + β1µ(S)
in equation (12), where µ(S) is the time-series mean of S. The four diﬀerent sets of estimates in Table 4
correspond to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the aggregate disturbance in Table 3. Note ﬁr s tt h a to na v e r a g e
ﬁrms are more willing to increase prices in response to adverse technology disturbances than lower prices in
response to favorable shocks: the elasticity on positive shocks is close to -0.2, while that on negative shocks is
close to -0.4 when the aggregate variables are at their steady-state means. We thus corroborate, although in a
diﬀerent environment, the results of Peltzman (2000) who ﬁnds that output prices are more likely to respond
to cost increases, rather than decreases. We next compute the eﬀect of a one standard deviation aggregate
shock on the elasticities γN
t and γP
t (e.g., α0 +α1 ×[µ(S)+σ(S)]), where σ is the standard deviation of the
aggregate disturbance, S). Notice that for all measures of aggregate disturbances, with the exception of CPI
inﬂation rates, an increase in the size of the nominal disturbances reduces the elasticity of sectoral inﬂation
to positive technology shocks by around 40% (e.g., from -0.21 to -0.12 for changes in CPI inﬂation), while
increasing that on negative technology shocks by 30% (e.g., from -0.42 to -.55 for changes in CPI inﬂation).
An increase in the inﬂation rate itself increases the responsiveness to technology shocks of all sectors in the
economy, although much stronger for sectors with negative technology shocks, as predicted by the model.
How important are these changes in elasticities quantitatively? To answer this question, we resort to
the following experiment. Note in equation 12 that the response of sectoral inﬂation rates to an aggregate
shock is ∂πit
∂St = ρ + α1εit if εit > 0a n d∂πit
∂St = ρ + β1εit if εit < 0 . We compute these derivatives for
all periods/sectors in our sample for the Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) measure of monetary
policy shocks, and average them across periods/sectors for a measure of how the aggregate manufacturing
industry responds to an expansionary nominal disturbance. We also calculate what these “impulse responses”
w o u l db ei nt h ea b s e n c eo fs t a t e - d e p e n d e n tt e r m sb yi m p o s i n gα1 = β1 =0 . As the table below34 indicates,
state-dependent terms increase the responsiveness of inﬂation rates to monetary shocks by almost 50% in the
second and third year following a shock, suggesting that endogenous variation in the identity and fraction
34Standard errors are reported in parantheses.





























We have performed several checks to ensure the robustness of our results.
Continuous parametrization of non-linearities
We ﬁrst ask whether we can ﬁnd evidence of non-linearities in the sectoral inﬂation rates response to
aggregate and sectoral shocks using a continuous parametrization of a sector’s responsiveness to technology
shocks. To this end, we estimate (see the justiﬁcation for this parametrization in Section 2)





+ γ3gt + uit, (13)
where the state-dependent model predicts that γ2 > 0. We again ﬁnd considerable support for the model,
for all measures of nominal disturbances. As Table 5 indicates, coeﬃcient estimates of γ2 are positive, and
signiﬁcantly estimated (t-ratios are in excess of 5) for inﬂation, changes in inﬂation, as well as commodity
price changes. Moreover, after a one-year lag, expansionary monetary policy shocks also cause a larger
responsiveness to technology shocks in sectors that are hit by more negative technological disturbances.
Technology shocks estimated using long-run identiﬁcation restrictions
We have redone all our work using an alternative measure of technology shocks, one based on long-run
identiﬁcation restrictions, in the spirit of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1999). Speciﬁcations in which
24labor hours enter in levels, but also in diﬀerences produce similar results to those reported above. Results
are available from the author upon request.
Time Aggregation
An additional concern is the time-aggregation of the data we use to test the state-dependent pricing
model. It can be shown that the state-dependent pricing model still predicts a non-linear relationship between
sectoral inﬂation rates and aggregate and sectoral shocks, even if the data used to estimate these non-linearities
is sampled less frequently than the frequency with which prices change in the model. The importance of non-
linearities falls as the degree of time-aggregation increases, which suggests that our results provide a lower
bound of the quantitative importance of state-dependent pricing rules in the data.
Counter-cyclical markups
The model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) predicts that periods of higher demand are periods in
which colluding ﬁrms are likely to behave more competitively. An extension of their model to incorporate
sectoral shocks would imply that markups fall during booms, and more so for ﬁrms in sectors with positive
technology shocks. Our ﬁnding above that the elasticity in response to negative technology shocks rises
during periods of economy-wide disturbances can then be driven by industrial organization considerations,
rather than costs of price adjustment. We tested this hypothesis by asking whether the asymmetry we ﬁnd in
our estimates of equation (12) is robust to including a measure of the degree of market concentration in the
industries we study. Let HHi be the Herﬁndhal-Herschmann index, available for four-digit industries from
the Census Bureau35. We allow the responsiveness of sectoral inﬂation rates to depend on both the size of
aggregate disturbances, but also the degree of the industry’s market concentration:
γN
t = β0 + β1St + β2 (HH × St), and
γP
t = α0 + α1St + α2 (HH × St),
35For each industry we calculate the average of the index over three years for which data is available: 1982, 1987 and 1992.
25and estimate the following equation:




























+ ρSt + uit.
(14)
If the results reported in the previous section are solely driven by the inability of oligopolistically
competitive ﬁrms to collude in booming periods, we should observe no asymmetries in industries with a large
number of small ﬁrms,where HH is close to 0, and large asymmetries in industries with a few dominant ﬁrms
and a high HH index. In Table 6 we report α1−β1, i.e., the diﬀerence in elasticities to positive and negative
technology shocks for sectors with a zero concentration ratio. Our results are similar to those reported earlier
and we once again strongly reject the null of time-dependent pricing36.
Sectoral Heterogeneity
As Bils and Klenow (2004) have documented, there is a large dispersion in the frequency of price
changes in the US economy. Diﬀerences in the frequency of price changes, as well as other sources of het-
erogeneity (e.g., variability of shocks) will lead to diﬀerences in the responsiveness of sectoral inﬂation rates
to sectoral and aggregate disturbances. One additional concern is therefore that the non-linearities identiﬁed
above are spurious, and simply reﬂect the fact that we do not allow for a diﬀerential response to sectoral and
aggregate shocks across sectors. We address this concern by allowing the elasticities to technology shocks, as
well as aggregate disturbances, to diﬀer across the 446 4-digit sectors in our analysis. We estimate














εit + uit (15)
where Di is a dummy for each SIC-4 sector, and report the results in Table 7. Note that heterogeneity
across sectors is indeed responsible for some of the non-linearities we have found above in the responsiveness
of sectoral inﬂation rates to nominal disturbances: the coeﬃcient estimates of α1 − β1 decline by almost
two-thirds when changes in inﬂation and commodity price changes are used as a measure of aggregate shocks
36We only report results based on three measures of nominal disturbances: CPI inﬂation, commodity price inﬂation, as well
as changes in CPI inﬂation for this and the subsequent robustness checks in order to conserve space.
26(although they decrease by much less when CPI inﬂation itself is employed). The statistical signiﬁcance of
these estimates is not aﬀected, and we again ﬁnd signiﬁcant non-linearities in the data, non-linearities that
cannot arise in time-dependent models.
Sub-sample Stability
We ﬁnally ask whether our results are robust across sub-samples, and in particular, before and after
the Volcker disinﬂation. We estimate equation (12) separately, using observations for the years 1961-1981
and 1982-1996. As Table 8 indicates, results are robust across sub-samples, although, not surprisingly, non-
linearities are easier to identify during the pre-Volcker era of higher and more volatile inﬂation rates.
5. Conclusion
If pricing is state-dependent, ﬁrms are more likely to pay the adjustment costs and change prices if
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks reinforce each other and trigger desired price changes in the same direction.
The state-dependent model therefore predicts that the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on
adjustment, varies endogenously in response to aggregate disturbances. This paper explores this asymmetry
in order to test whether pricing in the US economy is state or time-dependent. Using highly disaggregated
four-digit data on sectoral input, output and inﬂation rates in the US manufacturing sector, we ﬁnd that
sectors that are hit by negative technology shocks adjust more readily in times of greater inﬂation, increases
in commodity prices and larger monetary policy shocks. These results suggest that the timing of ﬁrm price
adjustments is indeed endogenous, as in state-dependent pricing models.
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29Table 1: Two measures of technology shocks
Standard 
Deviation Correlation
NBER MP Database TFP growth 0.076 0.63
Purified Solow residuals 0.063
Table 2: Comparison with Basu Fernald and Kimball (2004)
Degree of increasing returns
    Durable   Non-durable
our estimates BFK estimates our estimates BFK estimates
Lumber 0.84 0.51 Food 0.46 0.84
Furniture 1.05 0.92 Tobacco 0.84 0.90
Stone, Clay & Glass 1.32 1.08 Textiles 1.09 0.64
Primary Metal 0.95 0.96 Apparel 1.07 0.70
Fabricated Metal 1.17 1.16 Paper 1.02 1.02
Non-Electric Machinery 1.03 1.16 Printing & Publishing 1.25 0.87
Electrical Machinery 1.34 1.11 Chemicals 1.66 1.83
Transportation Equipment 1.08 1.05 Petroleum Products 0.98 0.91
Instruments 1.15 0.95 Rubber & Plastics 1.25 0.91
Misc. Manufacturing 1.24 1.17 Leather 1.19 0.11
median 1.11 1.07 median 1.08 0.89
correlation 0.71 correlation 0.41
correlation w/o outliers 0.77Table 3: Effect of Nominal Disturbances on the difference in (+,-) elasticities 








R2 0.37 0.15 0.17
# obs 16056 16056 16056
B: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks
45 6
CEE RR dates RR shocks
shock(t) -0.94 -0.43 -0.08
(0.37) (0.06) (0.03)
shock(t-1) 1.33 0.18 0.08
(0.41) (0.05) (0.03)
shock(t-2) 3.30 0.33 0.15
(0.41) (0.06) (0.03)
shock(t-3) 0.46 0.08 0.25
(0.45) ( 0.05) ( 0.03)
R2 0.17 0.26 0.27
# obs 16056 16056 12488
Notes:
1.  Fixed Effects estimates of α1-β1 in equation (12) reported
2.  Standard errors in parantheses (corrected for bias arising from two-stage estimation)
3.  In (6) we lose eight years of observations because Romer and Romer data is available from 1969
4.  Coefficient estimates on Romer dates and Romer shocks (contractionary shocks) are multiplied by (-1) Table 4: Is state-dependent pricing quantitatively important?
Elasticity of sectoral inflation 
to sectoral technology shocks
πt = µ(π) πt =µ(π) + σ(π)
positive shocks -0.245 -0.297
(0.013) (0.016)
(1) πt
negative shocks -0.326 -0.525
(0.012) (0.022)
πt = µ(∆π) πt =µ(∆π) + σ(∆π)
positive shocks -0.209 -0.118
(0.013) (0.016)
(2) ∆πt
negative shocks -0.424 -0.545
(0.015) (0.027)
πt = µ(∆Pcom) πt =µ(∆Pcom) + σ(∆Pcom)
positive shocks -0.225 -0.135
( 0.014) (0.016)
(3) ∆Pcomt 
negative shocks -0.405 -0.595
(0.015) (0.024)
∆shockt-2 = µ(shock) ∆shockt-2 = µ(shock)+σ(shock)
positive shocks -0.216 -0.156
(4) CEE monetary  (0.013) (0.017)
shock
(after a 2-year lag)
negative shocks -0.418 -0.547
(0.013) (0.023)
Note: 
           1 .  numbers in parantheses denote the specification used to estimate elasticities
                  and correspond to those in Table 3
          2.    standard errors in parantheses (these ignore uncertainty in our estimates 
                 of the mean and standard deviation of the three aggregate shocks)Table 5: A Continuous Parametrization of responsiveness to technology shocks
Coefficient estimates of the non-linear term








R2 0.20 0.14 0.16
# obs 16056 16056 16056
B: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks
45 6
CEE RR dates RR shocks
shock(t) 0.69 -1.01 -0.23
(0.71) ( 0.18) (0.04)
shock(t-1) 3.73 0.43 0.32
(1.08) (0.11) (0.05)
shock(t-2) 6.85 0.45 0.29
(1.05) (0.12) (0.07)
shock(t-3) 1.31 -0.17 0.39
(1.21) ( 0.09) ( 0.07)
R2 0.15 0.22 0.26
# obs 16056 16056 12488
Notes:
1.  Fixed Effects estimates of γ2 in equation (13) reported
2.  Standard errors in parantheses (corrected for bias arising from two-stage estimation)
3.  In (6) we lose eight years of observations because Romer and Romer data is available from 1969








R2 0.37 0.15 0.17
# obs 16056 16056 16056








R2 0.48 0.30 0.31
# obs 16056 16056 16056
Table 8: Sub-Sample Stability?
12 3







R2 0.42 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.21 0.11







































































Note: idiosyncratic technology set at steady-state-level 
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Figure 2: Value of Inaction in State and Time-Dependent Pricing Models 
Note: all other arguments set at steady-state levels 
log-deviation of price from its optimal level
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Figure 3: Fraction of adjusters in a sector: Fr(H, g)
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Figure 4: Responsiveness to technology shocks 

































g: price level growth rate
Time-Dependent Pricing
Figure 5: Effect of Aggregate Shocks on the Difference in (+,-) elasticities: 











































 Figure 6: Effect of Aggregate Shocks on the Difference in (+,-) Elasticities: 







NAppendix 1: Solving the State-Dependent Model
Recall that the ﬁrm’s problem is:






































where V =m a x (V a(s),Vn(s)), and s =( z−1,ψ,φ,g). We solve this problem numerically, using collocation.1 We











where φij() is an ij−th degree Chebyshev polynomial evaluated at the respective argument, Nj is the degree
of the approximation along each dimension, and ci1i2i3i4 the unknown coeﬃcients. This approximation reduces
the inﬁnite-dimensional problem of solving the system of two functional equations above to a ﬁnite-dimensional
non-linear system of 2N1N2N3N4 equations in the unknown coeﬃcients ci1i2i3i4. The equations we use to solve
for these unknown coeﬃcients arise from the condition that the system of equations above holds exactly at
N1N2N3N4 nodes along the state-space. A Newton routine is used to solve for the unknown coeﬃcients, as well
as to solve the maximization problem in the right hand-side of the ﬁrst equation. We use Gaussian quadrature
to form expectations (evaluate the integrals). The essence of this approach is to replace the joint-distribution
of technology and monetary shocks using a discrete distribution with K mass points. The weights and nodes of
the discrete distribution are chosen to ensure that the ﬁrst 2K moments of the original distribution are equal to
those of the approximant2.
The upper panel of Figure A1 plots the price function in the (z−1,g)a sw e l la s( z−1,a) directions, where
1This solution method is extensively discussed in Miranda and Fackler (2002).
2See again Miranda and Fackler (2002).
0a = ψφ is the ﬁrm’s technology. Note the region of inaction in which the ﬁrm’s nominal price is unchanged (the
center of the two ﬁgures), as well as the region in which the ﬁrm changes its price. The lower panel of the ﬁgure
plots the ﬁrm’s value of not changing its price in the (z−1,g) space. The ﬁrm’s value declines as g moves away
from 0 and z−1 away from 1. Finally, the lower-right panel of this ﬁgure plots the ﬁrm’s value (the maximum of
the value of adjustment and non-adjustment) and once again illustrates the region of inaction in which the ﬁrm
exercises the option to not change its nominal price.
We gauge the accuracy of the approximants we use by calculating the diﬀerence between the right and
left-hand side of the Bellman equations at points other than the nodes used to solve for the unknown coeﬃcients.
The maximum diﬀerence is small in absolute value (less than .5×10−4), suggesting the accuracy of the solution
method.
Appendix 2: Standard Errors for Two-Stage Estimates
We test the implication of state-dependent pricing mo d e l si nt w os t a g e sw i t hr e s i d u a l se s t i m a t e di nt h e
ﬁrst stage used as a dependent variable in the second-stage estimation. This appendix discusses how we calculate
asymptotic standard errors for our second-stage estimates that take into account the two-stage nature of our
estimation.
In stage 1, we rely on two-stage least squares regressions in which we retrieve residuals (technology shocks)
to be used in the second stage estimation. For each SIC 2-digit industry, we estimate technology shocks as the
residuals from the following Fixed Eﬀects 2SLS regressions. Letting ∆yit be the growth rate of log output of
industry i, ci be industry-speciﬁce ﬀects and g0
it =[ ∆xit,∆hit] be the regressors (share-weighted growth rate of
primary inputs), we estimate:
∆yit = g0
itα + ci +˜ εit
Let ξit be the instruments we use for g and rewrite the above expression more compactly as
Y = Gα +( IN ⊗ ιT)c + ε
1where G0 =[ g11,...g1T,...,gN1,...,gNT],Y0 =[ ∆y11,..∆y1T,...,∆yN1,...,∆yNT],c=[ c1,...,cN],I N is the identity
matrix, and ιT is a T×1v e c t o ro fo n e s .T h eF i x e d - e ﬀects two stage least squares estimate of α is
ˆ α =
³
˜ GPξ ˜ G
´−1
˜ GPξ ˜ Y
where ˜ G = QG, ˜ Y = Qy, Q is the matrix that demeans observations of sector-speciﬁc time-series means, and







,with ˜ ξ denoting the demeaned NT × j matrix of stacked instruments. We consider asymptotic
results for the case N −→ ∞, holding constant T. Under standard regularity conditions:
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d −→ N (0,V 1)
Assuming that technology shocks are serially and cross-sectionally independent and homoskedastic, we estimate
V1 using

















The technology shocks are therefore εit =ˆ εit +¯ yi − ¯ g0
iˆ α,w h e r eˆ εit are the residuals of the regression above,
and ¯ yi − ¯ g0
iˆ α the estimate of the ﬁxed eﬀect term. In the second stage, we construct ε
+
it =m a x ( εit,0) and
ˆ ε
−
it =m i n ( εit,0) and estimate
πit = θi + s0
tδ + γ1ˆ ε
+









where st are aggregate shocks and θi are ﬁxed-eﬀects. Letting β =
£
δ
0 γ1 γ2 γ0
3 γ0
4
¤0 , xit collect all the
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itβ)






ψ (zit,β, ˆ α)
where zit is the data we use in both stages of the estimation procedure and ˆ α are the coeﬃcient estimates from












zit, ˆ β, ˆ α
´
=0
A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expressi o no ft h i se x p r e s s i o na r o u n dθ and α yields:



































































































d → N(0,V 2)






































































Note however that ∂
∂βψ (zit,β,α) is proportional to uit, the error term in the second-stage regression, which
is by assumption orthogonal to technology shocks. Therefore, A12 = A21 =0 .A 22 i st h ea s y m p t o t i cv a r i a n c eo f
ˆ α in the ﬁrst-stage regression (V1 above) and V2 = B−1A11B−1 + B−1JV1J0B−1. We report ˆ V2,a so p p o s e dt o
B−1A11B−1 in the text.
3